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1 Introduction
What are the defining differences between hu-
man  and  animal  cognizers?  This  concern  has
driven  philosophers  and  scientists  for  a  long
time,1 well  before  Darwin’s  (1871)  theory  of
evolution  and  its  inherent  claim  of  develop-
mental continuity between the species. The pre-
vailing intuition has been, and often still is, that
1 See for example, Aristotle’s De anima.
even though we stand in a direct developmental
line  with  other  mammals  in  a  physiological
sense,  our  cognitive  and  affective  abilities  far
exceed theirs,  not  only in  a quantitative,  but
also in a qualitative sense. Criteria to support
this notion are frequently sought in an array of
special cognitive abilities, such as the ability to
speak (e.g.,  Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1985), the
Pompe-Alama, U. (2015). Crediting Animals with the Ability to Think: On the Role of Language in Cognition - A Commentary on Adina Roskies .
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 33(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570641 1 | 9
www.open-mind.net
possession of  concepts (e.g.,  Newen &  Bartels
2007), or behavioral traits like altruism or co-
operation (Hamann et al. 2011; Warneken 2013;
Warneken &  Tomasello 2009). All of these are
to varying  degrees  attributed  to  humans,  but
are either to a much lesser degree or not at all
ascribed  to  animals,  thus  representing  the
cornerstones of the critical divide between “us”
and “them” (Hare 2007). The problem raised by
Davidson and discussed by Roskies concerns the
special  case of beliefs and the general case of
the  attribution  of  propositional  attitudes  to
nonlinguistic creatures.
According to Davidson,  it  is  only in the
domain of human cognition that we can sensibly
apply  the  notion  of  thinking.  His  reasons  for
holding this conviction are manifold, as Roskies
uncovers beautifully in her treatment of David-
son.  The  general  line  of  argument  will  be
sketched out and discussed below. Roskies re-
futes Davidson’s arguments mainly on empirical
grounds, with the aim of establishing that non-
linguistic animals can be cognitive agents with
beliefs and mental representations, which func-
tion as kinds of propositional attitudes. In this
commentary,  I  would  like  to complement  this
line of reasoning by questioning what it takes to
credit  human  cognizers  with  thoughts;  or
rather, what we consider to be the prerequisites
for attributing thoughts and beliefs to humans.
Davidson puts much weight on the possession of
language. Here, I want to argue that focusing
on language as a necessary cognitive instrument
for being able to think poses a methodological
barrier for examining what the human ability to
think actually amounts to. Stressing the point
that the introspectively experienced properties
of thinking, a term that requires careful consid-
eration in itself,  should not be identified with
and  reduced  to  experiencing  inner  speech,  I
want to show that our understanding of what
thought is needs to be complemented by a bot-
tom-up investigation into the neural  processes
and mechanisms that produce higher cognitive
states, such as thoughts. I argue, therefore, that
our  introspective  access  to  the  way  thinking
presents itself to us as thinkers is only one part
that needs to be considered. What is required in
order to understand the phenomenon of think-
ing is first a suitable conceptual framework of
the  notions  “thought”  and  “thinking”,  which
distinguishes between their intentional and phe-
nomenological aspects, i.e., between the content
of propositional attitudes and the phenomenal
states of subjects making use of these attitudes.
Second, we need to show how the sub-personal
and personal levels of these factors can be dis-
tinguished from each other in order to show if
and how they are interconnected. These consid-
erations will be discussed in detail after a re-
view of  Roskies’s  discussion of  Davidson’s  ac-
count of language and belief. 
2 Roskies’ reconstruction of Davidson
What Roskies dubbed Davidson’s Master Argu-
ment is a reconstruction of Davidson’s position,
capturing in a nutshell both his basic assump-
tions about how we understand others and the
background to his claims about human cogni-
tion. As Roskies puts it: 
According to Davidson’s interpretationism,
having beliefs entails being an interpreter.
The basic idea of the Master Argument is
that possessing certain concepts is a pre-
requisite for being an interpreter, and that
an organism must have language in order
to have these concepts. […] the Master Ar-
gument links thought to language by way
of higher order thoughts. Specifically, Dav-
idson suggests that a concept of belief is a
prerequisite  for  propositional  attitudes,
and that a concept of belief is unavailable
without language. (this collection, pp. 6–7)
According to Roskies, then, Davidson is forced
to endorse the view that a cognizer must know
what  beliefs  are  in  order  to  have  them.  Can
Davidson’s view be sound? It might be correct
to  claim  that  a  cognizer  must  possess  the
concept of belief to recognize  herself as having
them or to be able to attribute such a state to
herself. This seems to be an act of metacogni-
tion,  in  which  a  subject  scrutinizes  her  own
mental  states  and  recognizes  them as  mental
states  of  a  special  kind.  But  is  having  the
concept of belief necessary for first-order cognit-
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ive acts, i.e., simply believing a proposition of
some kind without reifying this state as a belief
state? 
Before delving into this line of thought, let
us review Roskies’ structural reconstruction of
Davidson’s Argument.
M1 If S has propositional attitudes, then S has
beliefs. 
M2 If S has beliefs, then S has a concept of be-
lief. 
M3 If S has a concept of belief, then S has lan-
guage. 
MC If S has propositional attitudes, then S has
language. 
M1 seems to be correct, if a belief is seen
as  a  paradigmatic  kind  of  propositional  atti-
tude. 
M2 is  a  critical  premise  of  Davidson’s
Master Argument, as we have already indicated
above. The question in play here is: does having
a belief  automatically  entail  the  possession of
the concept of belief? We will discuss this point
once again further below. 
M3 is refuted by Roskies with the help of
studies on false belief comprehension in prelin-
guistic infants (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon 2005).
However, a further point might be made here:
M3 might indeed hold if having any concept at
all implies the possession of language. However,
there  are  models  of  non-  and  pre-linguistic
concept possession (cf. Mandler 2004; Newen &
Bartels 2007), which allow us to explain concept
acquisition during development; theories presup-
posing  language  as  necessary  prerequisite  for
the possession of concepts, however, fail to do
so. 
Roskies’ main criticism targets the notion
of the “concept of belief”. She aims to show that
Davidson employs the concept of belief incon-
sistently throughout his argument. If this is so,
then the argument fails due to equivocation. 
According to  Roskies, Davidson’s concep-
tion of belief can be understood in three ways.
She distinguishes three kinds of conceptions of
belief: “on this robust view, having a concept of
belief  is  an  epistemologically-rich  notion  that
entails having an ability to pass the ‘false belief
test’” (this collection, p. 7); the so-called defla-
tionary conception, in which “belief  can come
apart from reality”, (ibid.) and which amounts
to “having the concept of an objective reality”;
and last, the so-called intermediate concept of
belief,  which “involves the ability to attribute
representational  mental  states  to  oneself  and
others”, (ibid.). The intermediate concept of be-
lief,  as  its  name implies,  is  intended to be  a
weaker notion than the robust one. In the re-
mainder of the paper, Roskies deconstructs each
reading, providing empirical examples with the
aim of showing why and how Davidson fails to
make his decisive point, namely, that language
is a necessary prerequisite for holding beliefs.
The robust conception of belief is convin-
cingly refuted by studies on the ability to un-
derstand  counterfactual  beliefs  in  others,  as
demonstrated by the so-called false belief test.
Children  only  display  the  possession  of  a
concept of belief when they pass the false belief
test, usually at around the age of three to four
years.2 It is implausible, though, not to ascribe
propositional attitudes to them (in a first-order
sense) prior to having acquired such a robust
notion  of  belief.  It  can  even  be  claimed that
they  need  the  ability  to  ascribe  propositional
attitudes to develop a robust notion of belief in
the first place. Thus, the robust conception of
belief is not linked to having propositional atti-
tudes and Davidson’s premise M2 fails, if belief
is understood in the robust sense.
The second reading of belief, the deflation-
ary view, can be read out of Davidson’s stance
on so-called triangulation3 as a means of under-
standing objects as part of a reality external to
us—via linguistic interaction with another per-
son. However, as Roskies rightly states, the ar-
2 See however,  Apperly & Butterfill (2009) and  Butterfill &  Apperly
(2013).
3 The notion of triangulation that appears in Davidson’s later works,
replacing the notion of the so-called omniscient interpreter, captures
the idea that we can only attribute mental (propositional) attitudes
to  others  by  interpreting  their  utterances.  In  both  instances,  we
identify contents: the content of the utterance as well as the content
of the underlying mental attitude. This is, according to Davidson, a
necessary unit: without an utterance, we cannot ascribe determinate
propositional attitudes, which is why Davidson is committed to the
view that non-linguistic creatures cannot be interpreted, at least not
in a way that allows for the ascription of thoughts. This does not im-
ply that Davidson has to negate mental states in animals, but it does
mean that we cannot understand these mental states. The issue of
interpretability will be raised below (see issue #3).
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gumentative  force of  forging the link between
language as a means of recognizing the external
as external,  making it thus objective,  is  quite
weak.  Further,  it  would strike us a bit  of  an
overreach, if not as absurd, to assume that non-
linguistic creatures cannot develop any sense of
the external world as being external to them. 
The third and final understanding of belief
à  la  Roskies,  the  so-called  intermediate  view,
stating that animals understand other animals
as having mental representations of some sort,
which are behaviorally relevant, rests on empir-
ically  undecided  ground;  here,  however,  the
tight  connection  between  having  beliefs  and
possessing  the  concept  of  belief  is  called  into
question. 
Having a concept of  belief  might be im-
portant for reflective capacities, as we want to
attribute them to rational agents that must be
capable of justifying their actions, but not im-
portant for having beliefs: 
perhaps  being  a  believer  requires  being
able to think of oneself as a believer, and
thus  requires  the  concept  of  belief.  […]
However,  while there are arguments that
the ability to think about oneself as a be-
liever  is  required  for  a  rich  construal  of
theoretical rationality (see Bermúdez 2003,
Ch.  7),  there  is  no  clear  argument  why
such  reflective  ability  should  be  con-
stitutive  of  having  beliefs.  (Roskies this
collection, p. 11)
Roskies  has  thus  shown  that  the  connection
between propositional attitudes and the posses-
sion of a concept of belief (and its dependence
on language possession),  which Davidson tries
to establish, cannot be held in light of the di-
verging readings of the notion of the concept of
belief. Thus, Davidson’s strategy fails.
3 Beyond animal cognition: The case of 
understanding human thought
Davidson’s  standpoint,  from  which  his  thesis
makes sense and is plausible, begins from his as-
sumption  that  “radically  different  representa-
tion schemes” (Roskies this collection, p. 2) gov-
ern in animals and humans.4 However, such an
assumption clearly opens up a plethora of new
issues. Roskies targets these by drawing atten-
tion to the empirical concerns mentioned above,
thereby showing that an empirical foundation to
support  Davidson’s  background  assumption  is
missing. 
To my mind, these further issues resulting
from Davidson’s background assumption are the
following:
1) How can we defend the intuition that
animal and human cognition differ in kind? In
order to defend this view, it would seem that
one needs to identify a distinguishing criterion
that can account for the diverging representa-
tion schemes. It also has to be shown that this
factor is responsible for abilities that one group
of cognizers has and that is at the same time
missing in the other group. If language posses-
sion were to count as such a factor, it remains
to be shown which abilities hinge on its posses-
sion and execution. At the same time, following
this approach, it apparently needs to be estab-
lished that no non-linguistic creature cannot ex-
ecute a similar ability, not even in a partial or
proto-form. This difficulty leads us to issue 2:
2) How can we understand representation
schemes in animals if we do not suppose a kin-
ship to our own cognition? As Roskies rightly
states, we cannot but credit animals with nu-
merous cognitive abilities, given their at times
complex  and  often  obviously  intelligent  beha-
vior. Interpreting this behavior without acknow-
ledging  any  dependence  on  sensory  states,
memory, and certain motor skills, affects,  and
even social competencies, seems impossible. The
representation  schemes  employed  crucially  de-
pend  on  physiological  implementation.  If  the
physiological basis for the acquisition of envir-
onmental  information  is  alike  in  humans  and
4 The reason why Davidson is committed to this view can be de-
rived from the triangulation argument: since animals do not pos-
sess language, we cannot attribute determinate propositional at-
titudes to them. We have thus no way of knowing how they rep-
resent the world,  since  this is  not graspable  to us  through our
usual means of interpretation. The question, however, is whether
this epistemic opacity with regard to animal cognition necessarily
entails the ontological statement that their representation schema
are in fact different from ours, if representation schema are seen
to comprise sensory and affective states as well, and perhaps even
doxastic states preceding properly expressed, i.e., propositionally
coined, beliefs. 
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animals, how different can the representation of
environmental information in terms of sensory
and affective representations be? Even if a com-
plete overlap between human and animal per-
ception cannot be argued for on the basis of iso-
morphisms, we can (and perhaps must) commit
ourselves  to  the  systematicity  of  behavioral
cause-and-effect  relations.  It  is  this  systemati-
city that leaves little room for interpreting an-
imal cognition (at least in the sensory and af-
fective domain) as being radically different from
ours.
3) In light of Davidson’s interpretation-
ism, how much weight does language posses-
sion carry in terms of our ability to interpret
other cognitive agents? When we think of how
we “make sense” of another person, we rarely
rely  exclusively  on  the  other’s  verbal  utter-
ances. Rather, it would seem that we generally
seek to compare the contents of  their  verbal
utterances with their overt behavior; we hold
another responsible, as a rational agent, if her
expressed intentions diverge “too much” from
her behavior. Think of the following case: your
neighbor  tells  you  about  his  plans  to  save
some money for the upcoming summer vaca-
tion; the next day you see him walk into the
local casino where you know he spends quite
some time—and usually loses a fair amount of
money. In this case, we would probably be in-
clined to disregard the verbal utterance (“I’m
saving  up  for  a  nice  summer  vacation  over-
seas”),  and  rather  take  his  actions  (which
might involve compulsion or gambling addic-
tion) as indicators of his real motivations and
driving forces. 
4) Considering this case, we can ask which
role the analysis of another’s beliefs play in in-
terpreting and whether verbal utterances are a
true mirror of internal thought mechanisms and
proper beliefs. 
5) To my mind, the most salient question
is whether we can understand human cognition,
especially thought, with the help of notions like
beliefs (regardless of whether they are faithfully
uttered or not) and their conveyance via lan-
guage. Since the discussion of this issue will re-
quire some space, I shall dedicate a proper sec-
tion to it below.
3.1 Experiencing oneself while thinking—
the bias towards language
We can  understand  why  Davidson  (and  with
him many others)5 posits the possession of lan-
guage as a necessary condition for having pro-
positional attitudes. Namely, one may come to
the view that the way a human cognizer experi-
ences  her  thoughts is  predominantly conveyed
by her  sense  of  inner  speech.6 Consider  for  a
moment what it feels like to think.7
Probably the most prominent, identifiable
feeling related to thinking is that of your inner
voice, commenting on the world around you and
the world inside you, making you feel distinct
from,  yet  embedded  within  it.  Let’s  call  this
phenomenon—if  you  can  follow  me here—the
inner-speech  view8 with  regard  to  thinking.  I
will argue that this view is misleading. Our in-
tuitive  description  of  what  the  inner-speech
view comes down to is intricately linked to our
ability to express the contents of our thoughts
in words—the form of thoughts are, presumably,
sentences  that  are  composed  of  concepts  and
words, in our minds.
But is this identification of thought with
mental  speech  justified?  For  Vygotsky
(1934/1987),  it  is  clear  that  there  are  large
parts of thinking that do not rely on verbal ex-
pression:  “There  is  a  large  range  of  thinking
that has no direct relationship to verbal think-
ing” (Vygotsky 1934/1987, p. 115). Such a view
5 In fact, my point is here not to claim that this is Davidson’s motiva-
tion proper, but that we, as philosophers, can easily fall for the lan-
guage-bias, language being not only the instrument but also most of-
ten the object of our trade. 
6 One might object that Davidson’s focus on language is a result of his
roots in British analytic philosophy. While that is certainly true, it re-
mains to be seen where the preoccupation with language as a “window“
into the workings of the mind is derived from within this tradition; I
have a hunch that the inner-speech bias I sketch plays a role here as well.
7 It is debated whether there is a special (that is, a unique, propriet-
ary  and  distinctive)  phenomenology  of  thinking  (cf.  Bayne &
Montague 2011). I suspect, however, that this debate suffers from a
lack of distinction between the contents (or intentional aspects) of
thought and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The point I
wish to make is that the characterization of thought we gain through
introspective observation of ourselves while thinking does not grant
insight into the processes that precede and produce thoughts – and
this point is neutral with respect to the question whether there actu-
ally is such a thing as a distinct phenomenology of cognition. 
8 See, for example: Vygotsky (1934/1978);  Watson (1920); Carruthers
(2002).  Inner speech in Vygotsky’s view means the overlap (so to
speak) of our faculty of thought and our faculty of speech (cf. Jones
& Fernyhough 2006). 
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thus  allows  for  other,  non-verbal  types  of
thought,  such  as  pictorial  or  imagistic  ones,
such as come to bear, for example, in mental-ro-
tation  tasks  or  mental  imagery  (Shepard &
Metzler 1971;  Weiskrantz 1988;  Kosslyn et al.
2006). 
If these instances can be found, and identi-
fied as kinds of  thinking,  the hypothesis  that
language is the one and only tool for producing
thoughts in us seems simply false. That thought
is exclusively verbal appears thus as a form of
theory-induced illusion. One might say that the
fixation on language prompted by the analytic
tradition has thus resulted in the projection of
the method (the analysis of language) onto the
phenomenon (the human mind). 
Contemporary philosophy of mind left the
method of linguistic analysis behind some time
ago,  and in  order  to  get  away from the  lan-
guage-bias we should shift our focus from the
surface structure of thinking, namely its inten-
tional  and  phenomenological  (inner-speech)
characteristics, to the sub-personal level of the
underlying mechanisms and production schemes
of thinking. 
Such  a  reductive  approach  is  already  in
place in the numerous research efforts in cognit-
ive science that aim at describing and explain-
ing information processing in the brain: sensory
and affective components of cognition, as well
as aspects of motor behavior and memory are
studied in a very promising way—in the animal
as well as the human domain. The problem is
that our faculty of “thinking” is in this research
program a rather elusive phenomenon, for vari-
ous  reasons:  unlike  when  studying  the  neural
basis of perception, for example, thought pro-
cesses  cannot  be  studied  on  a  cellular  level,
since the identification of a stimulus is virtually
impossible: in vision, a stimulus is light hitting
the retina, whereas the “stuff” of thought is in-
formation provided by the  stimulus-processing
areas, thus, an “inner-system” medium. Localiz-
ing brain areas involved in thought and think-
ing,  on the  other  hand,  is  possible.  The pre-
frontal cortex has been shown to be involved in
planning  future  actions  and  other  high-level
cognitive  tasks  (Goldman-Rakic 1996;  Fuster
2008); however,  this structure is strongly con-
nected to a wide network of other cortical areas
and imaging studies show that high-level cognit-
ive tasks often if not always result from correl-
ated activity in multiple areas across the whole
of the cortex (Fuster 2008) which makes the in-
dividuation  of  the  “center  of  thought”  rather
difficult.
In light of these complications, it is helpful
to highlight the function that higher-cognitive
abilities have with regard to our overall beha-
vior.  Most researchers and philosophers would
agree that what this involves is  the conscious
representation of objects, including the deliber-
ate manipulation of information, retrieved from
memory  as  well  as  from  present  and  actual
stimuli, for the purpose of problem solving, de-
cision  making,  social  interaction,  communica-
tion, and action planning. The involvement of
language-processing  areas  in  the  execution  of
these  tasks  has already been shown (see  e.g.,
Goel et al. 2000)—but does this suffice to sup-
port  the  claim  that  language  is  a  necessary
cornerstone of  the neural  basis  of  higher-level
cognition in humans?
When “thinking” is divided and described
in terms of its functional rather than phenom-
enal properties, the question of how far thinking
relies on our capacity to speak or use language
can be replaced by the question of which brain
areas  and  input–output  relations  we  find  in-
volved in  the faculties  mentioned above.  This
program requires a reorientation in terms of re-
search methods and a redefinition of the phe-
nomenon:  the  phenomenological  description  of
“thinking”, e.g., in terms of inner speech, does
not supply us with an understanding of its un-
derlying processes and mechanisms. It is these,
however,  that we should know first before we
can put our finger  on the  role  that  language
(the inner and external version alike) plays in
the execution and the production of the cognit-
ive capacities listed above. 
When  we  cannot  help  but  attribute  the
ability to manipulate information in a creative
way to animals and intuitively call this “think-
ing” (think of the Kea, a species of bird known
for  its  curiosity  and  astonishing  abilities  in
handling difficult mechanisms—they can virtu-
ally break into a safe; cf. Auersperg et al. 2009;
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Huber &  Gajdon 2006;  Werdenich &  Huber
2006) we seem to have found a satisfactory cri-
terion for crediting animals with a form of de-
manding  cognition,  not  unlike  our  own,  even
though we cannot claim to understand what it
feels like or how the world represent itself to the
Kea. 
Such a language-independent form of high-
level  cognition  might  rule  in  us as  well,  such
that it precedes the formation of beliefs we form
on states of the world and their linguistic rep-
resentation. It might be the case, and this is the
point I want to stress in this commentary, that
we fall in a systematic way for a fallacy of ex-
perienced  thinking,  which  presents  us  with  a
linguistic  representation  of  the  contents  of
thought,  whereas  the  mechanisms  producing
these thoughts may not rely and are not caused
by speech and language involving neural mech-
anisms. 
One can object that this is not what Dav-
idson  had  in  mind  when  he  claimed  that
thought depends on language. Davidson’s idea
rests (so goes the defense) upon the assumption
that language is a universal format of informa-
tion processing unique to humans (in the first
place) and an instance of cognition, which lies
at the core of human cognition, regardless of its
temporal and causal involvement in the produc-
tion of thoughts. But this—so I want to claim—
amounts to a phenomenological argument, even
if Davidson presents it as a theoretical one. So
even if  language were the universal  format of
human thought, the empirical basis for such a
claim would be quite opaque, and any theoret-
ical argument so far rests on this weak empirical
basis. 
4 Conclusion
The question of whether thought is exclusively
verbal or linked to language capacity is not an-
swerable  from  a  phenomenological  point  of
view, since we can think of instances of mental
symbol-use that do not rely on language; on the
contrary,  we know that  language  “fills  in  the
void”, so to speak: when we acquire language, it
fulfills the cognitive demands to express refer-
ences and relations among them. In this view,
thought and thinking precede the linguistic rep-
resentation of the involved concepts.
If one wants to follow this line of thought,
it  remains  to  be shown how the  Davidsonian
dictum that animals do not have a special form
of cognitive ability,  namely, propositional atti-
tudes such as beliefs, desires etc., relates to the
general argument on higher-cognitive faculties,
which  do  not  depend  on  language  possession
and which are of the same kind across the an-
imal and human realms. It would thus have to
be argued for a language-independent form of
propositional attitudes. 
Does the inner-speech bias bear not only
on thinking at large but also our self-attribution
of desires and beliefs? It might. Roskies rightly
raises the question, contra Davidson, of whether
all our beliefs have definite content (this collec-
tion, p. 6). In my view, as soon as we hold a be-
lief qua belief, some kind of cognitive meta-rep-
resentation must come into play. Such a form of
meta-representation strikes me as probably be-
ing  conveyed  by  the  inner  speech  mechanism
and as thus being subject to the phenomenolo-
gical inner-speech fallacy. 
Roskies nicely disassembles Davidson’s ar-
guments and reconstructs them in a clear and
easy-to-follow fashion. She exposes their  argu-
mentative weaknesses (such as the issue of inter-
pretation and behavior) and provides ample em-
pirical examples of, and conceptual arguments
for, why we should not follow Davidson in his
assessment of animals’ cognitive abilities. How-
ever, I have tried to show that a further under-
lying claim can be made, namely that not only
is animal cognition a matter of speculation, but
that even our own inner workings are less trans-
parent than we commonly like to assume. Dav-
idson’s claim rests, to my mind, on the rashly
embraced yet unfounded assumption that lan-
guage plays a key role in higher cognition in hu-
mans (1984,  2001). In my view, contemporary
research  efforts  in  the  cognitive  sciences,  but
also in philosophy, undermines—or at least calls
into  question—this  assumption.  Certainly  we
are  dealing  with  an  important  philosophical
claim, which could only be properly backed up
by extensive empirical evidence pointing to the
ubiquitous  involvement  of  language-processing
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brain areas and mechanisms in higher-level cog-
nitive  tasks  such  as  decision-making,  action
planning,  deliberation,  etc.  Doubtless,  human
cognition  benefits  from  the  linguistic  format;
abstract thoughts about, e.g., liberty can prob-
ably  only  be  executed  at  a  significantly  deep
level if the relevant concepts have been provided
by a linguistic community. But the need to ex-
press a certain feeling, like freedom as the op-
posite of (the feeling of) constraint, for example,
certainly  originates  in  a  pre-verbal  or  non-
verbal manifestation of this feeling. 
Focusing on language, therefore, blocks a
fuller examination of what thinking in humans
amounts to. We have, I believe, misled ourselves
in  the  face  of  the  phenomenology  of  inner
speech as to what it is like to think, for us as
humans. But this gets us only part way towards
a full understanding of the underlying mechan-
isms, structures, and sources of thoughts.
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